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by Daniel D. Blinka
n late Janumy 2011, the Wisconsin Legislature amended Wis. Stat. section
907.02 to adopt the Daubert reliability standard found in Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and embraced by a majority of states. l The new standard applies to
all actions, civil and criminal, filed in Wisconsin state courts on or after Feb. 1,
2011. Cases f1led before then are governed by the relevancy standard, which had
been in place for decades.'
The Daubert test is the progeny of three remarkable cases: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Plwrnwceuticals Inc.,' General Electric Co. v. Joiner,' and Kumho Tire
v. Carmichael. 5 The Daubert trilogy created a reliability standard that is less a
bright-line test, as it is often assumed to be, and more an evidentiary porridge.
It is purportedly more liberal than the once-dominant general acceptance test
("too cold") yet more demanding than the relevancy standard ("too hot"). Finding Daubert to be "just light," in 2000 the U.S. Supreme Court amended the
Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), speCifically rules 701 and 702, to reflect the
Daubert trilogy. Wisconsin has now adopted these same rules.
At this writing the new legislation is just days old, but it excites a swirl of issues that
only time will resolve. Are the Daubert rules constitutional? Because the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has rejected the Daubert standard on several occasions, most recently in
early 2010,6 does this legislation violate the separation of powers?7 How will Wisconsin
courts construe the Daubert standard? Federal precedent is helpful but not binding.
Other jurisdictions, state and federal, reflect a continuum from strict to lax approaches
to expert testimony. Manifestly unclear is what it means to be a "Daubert state.'"
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Although the evidentimy foundation
under the Dal/bert rule will differ from
prior practice, whether more expert
testimony will be excluded as a result
remains to be seen.

'I,

Those issues aside, this primer
provides some immediate guidance
to courts and lawyers who will have
to apply the new standard relatively
soon. The primer's focus is on the new
foundational elements required by
Wis. Stat. sections 907.01 and 907.02.
The discussion draws heavily from the
excellent notes by the federal advisory
committee (hereinafter, "advisory committee") that accompanied the 2000
revisions to rules 701, 702, and 703 and
from pertinent federal cases, including selected Seventh Circuit decisions.
Although not binding on Wisconsin
courts, the federal precedent may be
helpful while state case law develops.
{Important changes also were made
to section 907.03, which governs the
permissible bases for e''Perts' opinions,

(1) and (2) are drawn from the former
rule: lay opinions must be "rationally"
based on the \vitness's perception and
helpful to a clear understanding of the
witness's testimony or to the determination of a factual issue. Subsection (3)
embodies the substantive sea-change
wrought by the Dal/bert amendments:
lay opinions cannot be based on the
"specialized knowledge" that is now
regulated by section 907.02's reliability
requirements. In sum, all testimony
is subject to a binary analysiS: it must
conform to section 907.01 as lay
testimony or section 907.02 as expert
testimony. There is no third way. Several obselvations are in order.
First, the crucial distinction is
between types of testinwny, not types
of witnesses. Clearly, the same person
(the witness) may provide testimony
that is both lay and e''Pert, but appropriate foundations must be in place.
The "skilled lay observers" discussed in
many cases likely will be casualties of

More from the author •.•
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In this video, Don Blinko explains the Daubert reliobility stondord's
effect on Wisconsin evidence rules and practice. Available with the

Morch 2011 Wisconsin lawyer online at www.wisbor.org/wl.

yet the changes relate mostly to the
form of expert testimony rather than its
admiSSibility, which is the focus here')

Amended Wis. Stat. sedion 907.01
(Lay Opinions)
Lay or e''Pert opinion testimony?

Section 907.01 has been amended to
conform to rule 701; it sets forth three
foundational elements. Subsections
16 - Wisconsin Lawyer - March 2011

the new rules; their testimony must be
supported by either a lay or an expert
foundation. This awkward distinction
purportedly eliminates "the risk that
the reliability requirements set forth
in [§ 907.02] will be evaded through
the Simple expedient of proffering an
expert in lay \vitness clothing.""
Second, in working under this
binary approach, Wisconsin courts
will grapple with many of the same

difficulties tllat federal courts have
encountered in distinguishing between
the two testimonial realms. The
advisory committee suggested that lay
testimony is the product of '''reasoning
familiar in everyday life' while e''Pert
testimony 'results from a process of
reasoning which can be mastered only
by specialists in the field.''' Although
tautological, the distinction helpfully
delineates between opinions tllat are
products of common sense, that is,
e''Periences that are generally shared
within tlle community, mId opinions
produced by specialized (esoteric)
knowledge that arise from specific
sets of experiences or training l l The
distinction is akin to determining
whether e''Pert testimony is necessmy
as a matter of law.
Third, tlle amended rule still
permits lay opinions of the sort that
comprise many types of common
generalizations and "collective experiences" (for example, "he was drunk,"
"she was speeding"). The advisory
committee asserted that the rule was
"not intended to affect the 'prototypical example[s] of the type of evidence
... relat[ing] to the appearance of
persons or things, identity, the manner
of conduct, competency of a person,
degrees of light or darkness, sound,
size, weight, distance, and an endless number of items that cannot be
described factually in words apart from
inferences.'''
These assurances aside, tlle new
rule will likely redirect courts and
litigants from two well-trodden evidentiary pathways, namely, in situations
involving lay opinions by owners about
the value of their property or testimony by police officers. In 2000, tlle
advisory committee blithely asserted
that rule 701 left unchanged the case
law permitting "the owner or officer
of a business to testilY to the value
or projected profits of the business,
\vithout the necesSity of qualifying tlle
witness as an accountant, appraiser, or
similar expert."12 This is fully consistent
with current Wisconsin case law. Nonetheless, recent federal cases, including
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Seventh Circuit decisions, have hmited
the scope of this practice based on
such factors as the owner's relative lack
of personal knowledge of the property,
hearsay, and the "complexity" of the
market in question. 13
Testimony by pohce officers illustrates similar struggles, It is tempting
to label as lay testimony anything
personally observed by the pohce
officer, whether in the specific case
or in other similar investigations, but
the difficulty is that section 907.01
addresses the experiences of"everyday
hfe" in the community, not the experiences of typical police officers who
investigate specilic crimes. Drug and
gang investigators acquire insights and
skills that are better assessed through
the lens of expert testimony. Federal
case law robustly reflects the difficulty
of drawing this distinction in particular
cases, especially when an agent intermingles her personal knowledge of the
case \Vitll her expertise in handling this
same type of investigation."
In sum, it is hkely that Wisconsin courts will encounter the same

prohlems tI,at have riven federal case
law. Doctrinal coherence will be best
preserved by associating lay testimony
with the kinds of things we all know
or likely have experienced, and expert
opinion testimony with everything
else that is associated with specialized
knowledge arising through uncommon

by facts and data, the reliability of the
witness's principles and methods, and
whether the witness applied both in
a reliable manner. These preliminary
questions of admissibility are governed
by section 901.04(1); they are decided
by the judge alone, unfettered by the
rules of evidence (for example, the
hearsay rules), and must be determined
to a preponderance of the evidence.
The jury assesses the weight of ti,e
admissible evidence. Finally, judges'
rulings on admissihility will not be
upset on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion."
The federal rules do not mandate
any particular procedural format for
making admissibility determinations. Indeed, the advisory committee

approvingly noted the "ingenuity and
flexibility" exhibited by trial courts in
resolving challenges to expert testimony." As has been the practice, trial
judges may resolve reliability issues by
the appropriate use of judicial notice
(for example, case law) or by using a
statnte that recognizes the validity of a
test (for example, DNA)17
When reliaMity is contested, tl16
options include:
• Holding a pretrial evidentiary hearing featUling the expert's
testimony;
• Holding a pretrial hearing
based on a paper record, for example,
affidavits, depositions, expert reports,
memoranda by counsel (such motions
often may accompany a motion for

[A]ll testimony is subject to abinary analysis: it must conform
to section 907.01 as Jay testimony or section 907.02 as expert
testimony.... The crucial distincti

etween types of

testimony, not types of witnesses.

experiences.

Amended Wis. Stat. section 907.02
(Expert Opinions)
Any opinion that relies on specialized
knowledge of any type is subject to the
new strictures of section 907.02. The
discussion below addresses many of
the key considerations that govern how
such admissibility determinations will
be made.
Procedural alternatives, Section
907.02 requires a range of findings
that mixes questions of fact and law,
namely, the witness's qualifications, the
helpfulness of the testimony, whether
the opinion is suffiCiently supported
March 2011 - Wisconsin lawyer - 17
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summaI)' judgment in civil litigation);
and
• Taking testimony at trial, subject
to a motion to strike.
Put differently, the trial judge is
not obligated to conduct an evidentiary
hearing whenever she is confronted
with a challenge to expert testimony. IS
The trial judge must, however, make
the findings required by section 907.02
when a proper objection is raised. I'
Relevance, qualifications, and
helpfulness. Although the 2011
amendments focus on the reliability of
the witness's methodology, the wilness
must be appropriately qualified and
the testimony must be relevant and
helpful to the trier of fact in determining a fact in issue or in understanding
the evidence. These three foundational
elements - relevance, qualifications,
and helpfulness - comprise the relevancy standard that applied before
2011. Under amended section 907.02,
the qualification element should speak
to the reliability of the \vitness's principles and methods and their application
to the facts. To truly assist the jul)', the
expert testimony must do something

If testimony is not presented in the
form of opinion, it may "otheJ'\vise"
take the form of exposition (a lecture)
if it will assist the trier of fact. The
lecture may explain how the expert
reached her opinion, or the COUIt may
resbict the wilness's assistance to just
presenting the lecture. The advisory
committee sanctioned this "venerable
practice" in e''Plaining current rule
702:
"[IJt might also be important in
some cases for an expert to educate

the factfinder about general prinCiples,
\vithout ever attempting to apply
these prinCiples to the specific facts of
the case. For example, experts might
instruct the factfinder on the principles
of thermodynamics, or bloodclotting,
or on how financial markets respond
to corporate reports, \vithout ever
knowing about or trying to tie their
testimony into the facts of the case."
E''Pository testimony need satisJY
only the pertinent requirements of
section 907.02, namely, "(I) the expert
be qualified; (2) the testimony address
a subject matter on which the factfinder can be assisted by an expert; (3)

There is no definitive list of reliability factors that must be
applied in all cases. Nor is there ahierarchy of factors that ranks
them in order of preference or weight. Which factors apply and
how they are weighed are within the court's discretion.
more than tell the jury how to decide
the case."
Opinions and exposition. Section
907.02 provides that experts may testify
in the form of an opinion or "other\vise." Opinions may be expressed to a
reasonable, not necessarily an absolute,
certainty; disputes over methodology
and controlling principles \vill often
arise and they \vill go to the weight of
the evidence'l This is consistent \vith
current VVisconsin law.
18 - Wisconsin Lawyer - March 2011

the testimony be reliable; and (4) the
testimony 'fit' the facts of the case.""
Sufficient facts and data. Expert
opinion testimony must be predicated
on sufficient facts and data. Although
this element calls for a "quantitative
rather than a qualitative analysiS:' it
anticipates that "experts sometimes
reach different conclusions based on
competing versions of the facts" and
"is not intended to authOlize a trial
court to exclude an expelt's testimony

on the ground that the court believes
one version of the facts and not the
other.''23 The suffiCiency determination is for the judge pursuant to
section 901.04(1) and is distinct from
but also related to the types of facts
and data an e''Pelt may rely on, wllich
is govemed by section 907.03.'"
More preCisely, section 907.03
permits experts to rely on inadmissible evidence prOvided it is of a type
reasonably relied on by experts in
dra\ving opinions or inferences. (Note
that the disclosure of inadmissible
bases on direct examination is now
subject to the restrictive standard
found in rule 703.) An expert's opinion may, of course, also be predicated
on admissible evidence, including
the use of hypothetical questions
wherein all factual predicates must be
established in the record.'" Regardless, section 907.02 mandates that
the judge must find that the "expert
is relying on a suffiCient basis of
information - whether admissible
information or not[.]""
Reliable principles and
methods. E''Pert opinion testimony
must be based on reliable prinCiples
and methods. In determining reliability, the trial judge may consider
a wide range of factors. There are
two distinct considerations: (1) What
factors should the judge consider in
determining whether the witness's
prinCiples and methods are reliable?
(2) When weighed against those factors, are the ",lness's principles and
methods indeed reliable? Both issues
are preliminary questions of admisSibility that are for the judge alone
under section 901.04(1), as discussed
above.
There is no definitive list of reliability factors that must be applied
in all cases. Nor is there a hierarchy
of factors that ranks them in order of
preference or weight. Which factors
apply and how they are weighed are
\vithin the court's discretion. This
is a much-misunderstood aspect of
the reliability standard. In Daubert,
the Supreme Court disclissed five
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nonexclusive factors in the context of
scientific (epidemiological) evidence.
Six years later it quelled a circuit split
when the Court clarified in Kumho Tire
tlmt the reliability analysis also applied
to nonscientiRc expert testimony.
When rule 702 was amended in 2000
to incorporate tlle Daubert trilogy, the
advisory committee pointedly underscored that no attempt was made to
"codify" speCific factors and that the
case law itself had "emphasized that
the factors were neither exclusive nor

dispositive." It descrihed the original
five Daubert factors as follows:
1) Whetl,er tl,e expert's technique
or theory can be or has been tested that is, whether the expert's theolY can
be challenged in some objective sense,
or whether it is instead simply a subjective, conclusory approach that cannot
reasonably be assessed for reliability;
2) Whether the technique or theory
has heen subject to peer review and
publication;
3) The known or potential rate of
error of the technique or theory when
applied;
4) The existence and maintenance
of standards and controls; and
5) Whether the technique or theory
has been generally accepted in tlle
scientific community.
The adviSOry committee also
offered the following sampler of additional reliability factors based on otl'er
federal cases (citations are omitted):
1) Whether experts are "proposing to testify about matters grO\ving
naturally and directly out of research
they have conducted independent of
the litigation, or whether they have
developed tl,eir opinions expressly for
purposes of testifying";
2) Whether the expert has unjustiRablyextrapolated from an accepted
premise to an unfounded conclusion;
3) Whether the e''Pert has
adequately accounted for obvious alternative explanations;
4) Whether the expert "is being as
careful as he would be in his regular
professional work outside his paid
litigation consulting"; and

Learn More about Daubert at the
Litigation, Dispute Resolution, and
Appellate Practice Institute, May 5-6
The litigation, Dispute Resolution, and Appellate Practice Institute: From Claims through
Appeals offers a full schedule of educational and training sessions in more than 30 different breakout sessions and plenary programs presented

by attorneys and judges who

are considered experts on their topics. Attendees can create their own elE curriculum
from a wide variety of sessions that are designed for all levels of experience - from
novice to advanced. The breakout session on

Dauber' is iust one example.

"Practical Tips and Techniques for Handling New Legislation 100uOOrl, Frivolous
Lawsuits, Punitive DamagesJ," on Friday, May 6, features expert commentary on what
recent and pending legislative changes mean for your clients and how to effectively
implement the changes into everyday practice.
The first ever litigation, Dispute Resolution, and Appellate Practice Institute will

be

held May 5-6, 2011, at the Frontier Airlines Center in Milwaukee. For more information
about this State Bar PINNACLpM program and to register, please visit www.wisbar.
org/institutes.

5) Whetller the field of expertise
claimed by the expert is known to
reach reliable results for tl,e type of
opinion the expert would give.
Again, "no single factor is necessalily dispOSitive of tl,e reliability of a
particular expert's testimony.-" Nor is
the lack of consensus in a ReId fatal to
the testimony. "General acceptance"
is but one factor a trial court may
consider. Moreover, rule 702 "is broad
enough to permit testimony that is
the product ofcompeting prinCiples or
methods in the same field oferpertise."'" Finally, tl,e U.S. Supreme
Court has expressly recognized that
"the trial judge must have considerable leeway" in making tl,e reliability
determination. 29
The daunting task for the trial
judge, then, is to determine which factors should be considered in assessing
reliability in the Rrst instance.'" Once
tllose factors are selected, tlle judge
decides whetl,er the \\;tness's plinciples and metllOds are reliable when
measured against those standards. For

example, a judge might decide tl,at
"general acceptance" by practitioners
in the field is the only factor she ,vill
consider, particularly in cases in which
the dispute among experts centers on
a method's application to the facts.
The focus must be on the prinCiples
and metllOds; appellate courts give
short shlift to trial judges who unduly
focus on the witness's qualifications. 31
Regardless of the th res hold factors,
tlle judge may resort to judicial notice,
testimony, depositions, or affidavits to
determine if the standard is met.
Misapplication risks: Did the
,vitness reliably apply an otherwise reliable methodology? Section
907.02 also requires a separate finding
tl,.t tl,e ,vitness reliably applied the
otherwise-reliahle plinciples and methodology. The concern is that "when an
expelt purports to apply prinCiples and
methods in accordance witll professional standards, and yet reaches a
conclusion tl,at otl'er experts in tlJe
field would not reach, the tlial court
(continued on page 60)
March 2011 - Wisconsin Lawyer -19

Daubert Standard

(from page 19)
expertise. The advisory committee
may fairly suspect that the principles
observed the follO\ving:
and methods have not been faithfully
"Some types of expert testimony
applied." Put differently, "the trial
\viII be more objectively verifiable, and
court must scrutinize not only the prin- subject to the expectations of falsifiabilCiples and methods used by the expert, ity, peer review, and publication, than
but also whether those principles and
others. Some types of expert testimony
methods have been properly applied to \viII not rely on anything like a scientific
the facts of the case.""
method, and so \vill have to be evaluThese problems will likely arise in
ated by reference to other standard
two broad scenarios. One involves the
prinCiples attendant to the particular
expert who Simply botches the applica- area of expertise. The trial judge in all
tion of a solid methodology. Asecond
cases of proffered expert testimony
involves the creative expert who applies must find tllat it is properly grounded,
a reliable metllodology in novel ways,
well-reasoned, and not speculative
thereby triggering concerns that the
before it can be admitted. The expert's
end result is unreliable.
testimony must be grounded in an
Speciallized knowledge: scienaccepted body of learning or experitific and nonscientific expertise.
ence in the expert's field, and tl,e
Section 907.02 applies to all forms of
expert must explain how the conclusion
specialized knowledge. Experience
is so grounded."
alone, "or experience in conjunction
Absent judicial notice, case law, or
\vith other knowledge, skill, training, or a statute, the courts must look to the
education," may provide a sufficiently
expert \vitnesses for insight into their
reliable basis. "In certain fields, experi- "body of learning or experience" and
ence is the predominant, if not sole,
the metllOdology that applies tllese
basis for a great deal of reliable expert
prinCiples. The advisory committee
testimony."33
provided the follO\ving illustration:
Regardless of tlle field or tl,e
"For example, when a law enforcemeans by which practitioners acquire
ment agent testifies regarding the use
their speCialized knowledge, section
of code words in a drug transaction, the
907.02 demands a threshold sho\ving
prinCiple used by the agent is that parof reliable principles and methods.
ticipants in such transactions regularly
Medical doctors and physicists are held use code words to conceal the nature
to the same standard as car mechanof their activities. The metllod used by
ics and police gang-unit officers. But
the agent is the application of extensive
the reliability factors must be assessed
experience to analyze tlle meaning
differently depending on the area of
of the conversations. So long as the

60 - Wisconsin Lawyer - March 2011

principles and methods are reliable
and applied reliably to the facts of the
case, this type of testimony should be
admitted."
The problem, of course, is that
the "principle" (code words conceal
criminal activity) and the "method"
("I applied my extensive experience to
crack the code") hardly seem the stuff
of expertise, yet the testimony does
draw on specialized experiences that
lay people (most of us) Simply do not
have. In sum, the reliability analysis
turns on the expert \vitness's ability
to amculate \vith some specificity the
principles and methods on which he
or she relies. A \vitness who cannot
articulate an underlying methodology presents the risk of ipse dixit
testimony.
Beware ipse dixit testimony.
Coursing through Daubert lore is a
palpable fear of ipse dixit ("because
I said so") testimony.'" No matter
whether the \vitness has a Ph.D. or
wears a police badge, she is expected
to articulate her methodology and how
she applied it to the facts:
"If the \vitness is relying solely or
primarily on experience, then the \vitness must explain how that experience
leads to the conclusion reached, why
that experience is a sufficient basis for
the opinion, and how that experience
is reliably applied to the facts. The trial
court's gatekeeping function requires
more than simply 'taking the expert's
word for it.' ... The more subjective
and controversial the expert's inquiry,
the more likely the testimony should
be excluded as unreliable.'·35
To reiterate, "[tlhe expert's
testimony must be grounded in an
accepted body of learning or experience in the expert's field, and the
expert must explain how the conclusion is so grounded."36Yet the question
lingers: how much explanation is
enough?
Less troublesome issues are posed
by the use of scientific and technical
experts who practice in fields flooded
with textbooks, learned articles, and a
prevailing wisdom expressed in its own

Daubert Standard

lexicon. By dint of academic education alone such experts are usually
capable of explaining their underlying principles and the application of
their methodology to the case-specific
!C'Cts in a lingua franca intelligible to
the court. But even technical experts,
like engineers, can fail the test, as in
Kumho Tire, in which the Court found
that an engineer's opinion amounted to
little more than his ipse dixit."
Manifestly, Kumho Tire did not
slam the door on experience-based
expert testimony in fields lacking an
academic patina. Rathel; it insisted
that such witnesses offer at least some
articulated rationale supporting their
opinions, which need not be impossibly demanding:
"In certain cases, it will be appropriate for the trial judge to ask, for
example, how often an engineering
expert's experience-based methodology has produced erroneous results,
or whether such a method is generally
accepted in the relevant engineering
community. Likewise, it "oll at times
be useful to ask even of a witness
whose expertise is based purely on
experience, say, a perfume tester able
to distinguish among 140 odors at a
sniff, whether his preparation is of
a kind that others in the field would
recognize as acceptable:'38.
Ooe wonders how a perfume
tester would verbalize those 140
odors without running afoul of the
ipse dixit proscription, but the case
law is filled with many less whimsical
situations, involving for example, law
enforcement olTicers, who testify in
gang- or drug-related cases. Although
they often have some formal training,
the bulk of their specialized knowledge arises through the handling
of hundreds of such cases. Like the
perfume tester, police officers should
be prepared to discuss the acceptable
methods employed by such investigators along with generalizations that
arise from their experiences. Only
when the witness identifies her principles and methods is the trial court in
a position to assess their reliability.

Admissibility and weight of the
expert testimony. Section 907.02
regulates the admissibility of expert
opinion testimony. The weight of
the evidence is for the trier of fact.
The witness may be impeached in all
ways permitted by the evidence rules.
Contradictory e'pert testimony, including "testimony that is the product of
competing principles or methods in the
same field of expertise," is admissible.
The latitude flows from the recognition
that reliable principles and methods do
not always beget correct answers."
Conclusion

.What effect will Daubert have in Wisconsin courts? It is too early to know
for sure but some perspective may
be helpful. Federal courts appear to
set the reliability bar high in toxic tort
cases. Other studies seem to show that
federal judges are more closely scrutinizing, and more frequently excluding,

expert testimony in the wake of
Daubert. Among states adopting the
Daubert standard, jurisdictions diverge
between strict and lax scrutiny of
expert testimony. Some studies suggest
that in criminal cases, the admissibility
standards are unchanged.'"
It is unclear whether expert
opinion testimony will be excluded
more often under the new rules, yet
the rules undoubtedly will affect trial
preparation because the foundational
issues are very different. The need
to make hairsplitting distinctions
between lay and expert testimony
along \vith the intricacies and ambiguities of the reliability determination are
only some of the hurdles that await
courts and lawyers as we Jearn to work
\vith these rules. As stated earlier, what
it means to be a "Daubert state" is
debatable, and the case law itself is not
always a reliable guide to determining
the reliability of expert testimony.
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